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 Recent media reports have been filled with violent and tragic situations in Mexico that 
cover stories about the police, gangs, drug cartels, and their involvement in crimes like mass 
murders and disappearances. Stories involving Mexico’s Federal Police and the killing of 
unarmed civilians have gained publicity and caused international outcry.1 Numerous reports have 
covered disappearances, police abuses, gang confrontations, and drug-related violence that 
involve Mexican police, military, and government officials.2 More specifically, police abuse and 
brutality is not new in Mexico, yet it seems to be part of a trend in which police brutality is seen 
by international media as almost commonplace.3 Furthermore, Mexico’s Federal Police, the most 
powerful public security force in Mexico, has been involved in the regular violations of human 
rights, including torture, arbitrary detention, and mental and physical abuse.4 
 This paper sets out to examine recent violence, crime, and public insecurity in Mexico 
while analyzing the potential causes of police and drug cartel violence that perpetuate crime and 
tragedy throughout the country. While the majority of this violence takes place at home in 
Mexico, drug trafficking organizations and organized crime syndicates threaten state 
sovereignty, border security, and human populations on both sides of the US-Mexico border. 
Mexico’s current crime situation involves multiple actors and all aspects of government and 
society. This paper will analyze modern violence in Mexico and look into historical, institutional, 
and cultural explanations of why Mexico and its people may be in the situation that they find 
themselves today. This paper will not only show that a relationship exists between drug 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Reuters, “Media Reports Say Mexican Police Were Involved in January Killings,” The New York Times, April 19, 
2015, http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2015/04/19/world/americas/19reuters-mexico-violence-massacre.html. 
2 Ibid. 
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http://www.proceso.com.mx/?p=401646. 





trafficking organizations and police brutality, but will use what has been written on this 
important subject to give a deeper analysis of current public insecurity and why police and drug 
cartels perpetuate public vulnerability and crime. An examination of modern police reform 
efforts, human rights abuses committed by the Federal Police, trends in drug violence, and 
qualitative and quantitative comparisons to multiple factors contributing to Mexico’s dangerous 
situation will hopefully provide policy makers with an understanding that allows them to 
implement new agendas that can break the vicious cycle of drug violence, corruption, police 
brutality, and public insecurity.  
Violence, Impunity, and Human Rights: A Bleak Situation 
 In Mexico, crime rates and criminal activity have risen dramatically since the early 
2000s. Donnelly and Shirk show that violence in Mexico related to organized crime and drug 
trafficking has increased due to the breakdown of major cartels over the past decade.5 Moreover, 
in 2009 Mexico was deemed by US analysts to be one of two countries worldwide that was most 
likely to suffer a collapse into a failed state due to increasing levels of violence and crime.6 
Luckily, the past decade has proven to be fruitful in democratic elections and institutional 
reforms, yet violence and crime still abound. Criminal activity in Mexico is not simply attributed 
to that of organized crime and drug trafficking; rather, the recent increase in violence represents 
a twofold increase of both common and organized crime.7  
It is important to note the difference between common crime and organized crime. While 
overlap between the two concepts can exist in the form of low-level organized crime (including 
mugging, burglary, or prostitution-rings), a clear difference exists in which organized crime is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Robert Donnelly and David Shirk, “Introduction,” in Police and Public Security in Mexico (University Readers, 
Inc., 2009). 
6 David Shirk, “Future Directions for Police and Public Security in Mexico,” in Police and Public Security in 
Mexico (University Readers, Inc., 2009). 




defined by higher-level crime syndicates carrying out sophisticated large-scale operations that 
can include kidnapping and the smuggling of drugs, weapons, money, and human beings.8 
Common crime includes violent forms of robbery, homicide, assault, and rape that are carried 
out by individuals or small groups of criminals who are unaffiliated with larger crime 
organizations.9 In recent years, there have been increased occurrences of kidnapping, drug 
trafficking, and arms trafficking along the US-Mexico border by drug trafficking organizations 
and organized crime groups.10 While common crime in Mexico is one of the biggest threats to its 
security, the presence of drug traffickers, armed groups, and terrorist organizations represents an 
important national and public security issue.11 
 Generally, Latin America has experienced a rise in homicide rates while those of the rest 
of the world are falling.12 These increasing crime and violence trends in Mexico specifically are 
evidenced by increases in arrests for homicides, rapes, assaults, and robberies; while it is 
contested whether or not the data represents an increase or decrease in violent crime, there has 
been an obvious increase in activity by Mexico’s public security apparatus over the last two 
decades, pointing to a significant challenge for Mexico’s police and justice institutions.13 A 
widespread sense of public insecurity in Mexico deepens the problematic trends in violence and 
crime.14 Jiménez shows that growing feelings of public insecurity throughout Mexico are 
strongly correlated with current trends in violent crime.15 While victims of crime generally feel 




11 Ana María Salazar, “Campañas Políticas ante la Inseguridad,” in Seguridad Pública: Voces diversas en un 
enfoque multidisciplinario (México: Editorial Porrúa, 2005). 
12 Mariana Mota Prado, Michael Trebilcock, and Patrick Hartford, “Police Reform in Violent Democracies in Latin 
America,” Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 4, no. 2 (2012): 252–85. 
13 Donnelly and Shirk, “Introduction.” 
14 René Alejandro Jiménez Ornelas, “La percepción, componente indispensable contra la inseguridad,” in Seguridad 





more insecure than the common public, Zepeda explains that the majority of Mexicans do not 
feel safe overall.16 This can have dramatic effects on Mexican society, including the fractioning 
of cities, deterioration of public spaces, losses in the quality of life, and difficulties in attracting 
visitors.17 Overall, a climate of insecurity and violence threatens the current Mexican state. 
 Mexico’s public security institutions have been ineffective in preventing and confronting 
crime and criminals; this creates incentives for society to become more inclined to use crime as 
the means to achieve various ends, as they will have little trust in their own safety along with 
little incentive to follow the law in safeguarding their lives and property.18 Even though Mexico 
has seen a major increase in activity by its public security apparatus in the last two decades, 
Mexico’s law enforcement apparatus has been largely inefficient in combatting crime—
especially that committed by the drug trafficking organizations.19 According to Guillermo 
Zepeda Lecuona, the very institutions that were created to establish a sense of public security and 
law enforcement have currently been contributing to violence and insecurity.20 He explains that 
in Mexico, fewer than one in five inquiries to the police conclude satisfactorily and that the 
police suffer from case overload on crime and prosecution.21 
 As a result of the violence, insecurity, and ineffective public security institutions, 
Mexicans have begun to arm themselves because they do not trust the state to provide personal 
and societal protection; this generates violence and population migration, which hinders 
development and education levels in Mexico.22 This problem is further complicated by the fact 
that 75% of crimes in Mexico are unreported by the public, thus reflecting low confidence in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Guillermo Zepeda Lecuona, “Criminal Investigation and the Subversion of the Principles of the Justice System in 
Mexico,” in Reforming the Administration of Justice in Mexico (University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 133–52. 
17 Jiménez Ornelas, “La percepción, componente indispensable contra la inseguridad.” 
18 Salazar, “Campañas Políticas ante la Inseguridad.” 
19 Shirk, “Future Directions for Police and Public Security in Mexico.” 
20 Zepeda Lecuona, “Criminal Investigation and the Subversion of the Principles of the Justice System in Mexico.” 
21 Ibid. 




public security.23 Moreover, this demonstrates a major democratic and human rights problem for 
Mexico. Drug trafficking organizations have infiltrated government positions in many areas, and 
their influence over state personnel has dramatic implications.24 A culture of impunity prevails in 
which human rights are not respected and crime flourishes.25 High levels of violence, insecurity, 
and impunity contradict democratic ideals of peace, which hinder the social, political, and 
economic development of Mexico still today.26 
 Theoretically, Mexico is a democracy with a sense of human rights that have been 
adopted by the state and inputted into legislation. Human rights are the liberties, abilities, or 
recognitions to basic benefits that include the whole person for the simple fact that their human 
condition guarantees them a dignified life.27 The purpose of public security, however, is to 
guarantee that these human rights are enforced and respected. Therefore, in the wake of 
corruption and drug violence, why have Mexico’s public security forces failed? 
 Mario Vázquez Raña paints a bleak picture of Mexico. Private security organizations are 
on the rise, populations are attempting to emigrate, and the police are part of the human rights 
abuse problem in Mexico.28 Democracy, and respect for human rights combined with a secure 
public, seems far way. The state must attempt to preserve itself in the wake of other issues such 
as poverty and inequality.29 However, before the Mexican state can address its problems with 
public insecurity, violence, and police abuse, it must first determine what the initial causes are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Donnelly and Shirk, “Introduction.” 
24 Ibid. 
25 Salazar, “Campañas Políticas ante la Inseguridad.” 
26 Mota Prado, Trebilcock, and Hartford, “Police Reform in Violent Democracies in Latin America.” 
27 Carlos Barrachina, “Seguridad Pública, democracia y derechos humanos,” in Los Derechos Humanos en el marco 
del Nuevo Modelo de Policía (México: Centro de Investigación y Estudios en Seguridad, 2012). 
28 Mario Vázquez Raña, “La Seguridad Pública en México,” in Seguridad Pública: Voces diversas en un enfoque 





that have allowed for a society in which police violence and impunity creates widespread 
insecurity. 
A Result of History: Why the PRI and War on Drugs Have Perpetuated Modern Insecurity 
Mexico’s PRI 
 Mexico’s Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institutioncal—PRI) 
has dominated Mexican political institutions since its founding in 1929 until 2000 when a rival 
political party, the National Action Party (Partido Acción Nacional—PAN) stole the presidency 
in one of Mexico’s first truly free and fair elections.30 Although the party has undergone two 
name changes, it was able to remain in power through its ability to establish a party-state system 
that resulted in authoritarian rule by Mexico’s only legitimate political party.31 The party was 
able to monopolize all legislative, executive, and judicial government institutions during its 70 
years in power through the use of co-optation and repression of rivals.32 Combined with 
networks of patron-client relationships in all levels of society, the party created a dominating 
state under a façade of democracy in which successors to the presidency were “hand-picked” by 
party elites in control of political power.33 During its hegemony, the PRI oversaw an informal 
system in which societal actors—police, military, drug lords, and local political officials—
benefitted from the PRI’s control over the maintenance of public stability and drug activity.34 
The PRI’s dominance extended over all forms of power in Mexico and it used control as a 
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31 Ibid. 
32 Julien Mercille, “Violent Narco-Cartels or US Hegemony? The Political Economy of the ‘war on Drugs’ in 
Mexico,” Third World Quarterly 32, no. 9 (October 2011): 1637–53, doi:10.1080/01436597.2011.619881. 
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“highly effective political machine” in which clientelistic networks of patronage and graft 
determined political outcomes.35 
 The effect of the PRI on Mexico’s public security apparatus was significant. Due to 
historically authoritarian attitudes, there were not many rules that the police needed to follow 
with respect to human beings and human rights; rather, police existed to help guarantee the 
survival of the PRI regime.36 In an authoritarian regime, political power is concentrated in few 
hands; the public then deals with arbitrary, selective, and difficult access to mediums and 
resources such as information, voting, and public participation.37 Because decisions by those in 
power (including the public security apparatus) were adopted to favor one group, a sense of 
freedom and human rights was nonexistent. The PRI used institutions such as the police and 
military in order to survive, and these were closely linked to the office of the president.38 Little 
attention was paid to the general public, and any dissenters against the regime were punished.39 
 Scholars who favor a historical cause of modern police impunity say that Mexico’s 
current situation is a legacy of the historical authoritarian regime and its dominance over the 
Mexico’s police and justice system.40 In order to effectively suppress threats to the survival of 
the regime, the police in Mexico were trained and used as a tool by the PRI to do whatever it 
took to support the ruling party and either co-opt or repress anyone who was dangerous to the 
PRI’s authority.41 Following the rule of law and attending to human rights would not guarantee 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Marcos Pablo Moloeznik, “Public Security, Criminal Justice, and Human Rights: A Critique of PAN Governance 
in Jalisco, 1995-2006,” in Reforming the Administration of Justice in Mexico (University of Notre Dame Press, 
2007), 463–87. 
36 Barrachina, “Seguridad Pública, democracia y derechos humanos.” 
37 Ibid. 
38 Sigrid Artz, “The Militarization of the Procuraduría General de La República: Risks for Mexican Democracy,” in 
Reforming the Administration of Justice in Mexico (University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 153–74. 
39 Salazar, “Campañas Políticas ante la Inseguridad.” 
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survival of the regime and scholars contest that this mindset continues today. The PRI became a 
“perfect dictatorship” in which violence not only existed in society, but also was utilized by 
public security forces to maintain public order.42 
 During the PRI, then, Mexican citizens suffered under a corrupt police force, weak 
judicial systems, and high instances of criminality.43 Diane Davis contends that because Mexico 
had low levels of democracy in the past, human rights abuses and the “un-rule” of law that 
existed under the PRI have become part of Mexican culture and thus paralyzed the government 
in its attempts to enact police reform.44 Today’s state of public security is similar to what it was 
during the PRI.45 Supporters of this argument say that because the regime was so concerned with 
survival, Mexico has historically suffered from weak political institutions in which little attention 
was paid to the professional and technical development of political actors.46 Therefore, it was 
natural for the police to become biased, corrupt, and abusive—they were solely concerned with 
maintaining internal order instead of protecting the citizenry.47 The PRI has paved the way for 
establishing a society in which impunity prevails, rights are abused, and modern police forces 
abet historical norms.48 
 It is important to note, however, that the public security institutions of Mexico were 
altered and reformed throughout the PRI’s existence in response to the needs of the party and 
public stabilization; all reforms, either through centralization or decentralization, were produced 
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43 Diane E. Davis, “Undermining the Rule of Law: Democratization and the Dark Side of Police Reform in Mexico,” 
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44 Ibid. 
45 Moloeznik, “Public Security, Criminal Justice, and Human Rights: A Critique of PAN Governance in Jalisco, 
1995-2006.” 
46 Lucía Dammert and Mark Ungar, “La necesidad de un nuevo modelo de policía en México: Una perspectiva 
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2012). 
47 Ibid. 




in order to maintain power.49 Today’s police force maintains legacies of corruption, insufficient 
personnel, low salaries, and poor equipment that were common throughout the PRI’s rule. 
Unfortunately, the PRI cannot alone stand as the sole historical reason for police abuse in 
Mexico. Rather, the presence of growing common and organized crime that coincided with PRI 
hegemony must be examined in order to account for a deeper understanding of modern police 
violence and impunity. 
Drug Violence, Organized Crime, and the Eventual War on Drugs 
Many authors say that the emergence of drug violence in Mexico, in combination with 
the PRI’s hegemony, has allowed for public security and the abuse of human rights to flourish. 
While organized crime has existed in Mexico since the colonial era, Mexico’s current crime 
organizations began to emerge in the 1920s and 1930s in light of drug and alcohol prohibition.50 
Drug trafficking in Mexico became more consolidated when US demand of Colombian cocaine 
grew in the 1970s and 1980s, causing Mexico to emerge as a major drug transit location.51 In the 
2000s, competition between the various drug trafficking organizations became intense and 
violent after Felix Gallardo’s organization, the Guadalajara Cartel, fractured during the 1990s 
into a variety of regionally based and competitive groups.52 This fracturing has led to a major 
increase in drug-related violence in Mexico at the hands of organized crime groups. It should be 
noted that the scale and scope of organized crime groups varies greatly throughout Mexico, yet 
the role that drug trafficking organizations and gangs have played in the increase of violence and 
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corruption cannot be ignored when examining the causes of current police violence and public 
insecurity.53 
Donnelly and Shirk note that the growth in violence related to drug-trafficking 
organizations is one of the most serious challenges facing Mexico’s law enforcement authorities 
today.54 Mexico has not only served as a transit route of drugs into the US from Colombia and 
other South American countries, but is also an important supplier of drugs to the United States.55 
Changing patterns in drug trafficking is a result of shifts in US consumption, changing counter-
drug strategy, the weakening of Colombian organized crime, and political democratization as the 
PRI weakened and eventually lost power in 2000.56 
Carlos Antonio Flores Pérez has noted that there have been four stages in the evolution of 
illicit activity and the ties of conspiracy between public officials and drug traffickers in Mexico; 
in this history, ties between government officials and organized crime groups emerged and 
evolved into what is today a corrupt, violent, and intertwined system of drug networks and 
government officials.57 Organized crime related to drug production first emerged between 1914 
and 1947, and it was during this time that local-level political powers attempted to subordinate 
illicit drug activities.58 Between 1947 and 1985, federal security institutions were created to 
mediate between political powers and organized crime groups.59 During this time period, a 
centralized and hierarchical regime between public officials and organized crime groups 
developed into top-down relationships in which Mexican security organizations protected the 
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illicit drug trade.60  This centralized-hierarchical relationship favored the expansion of drug 
trafficking in Mexico in the 70s and 80s and was a result of increased US demand, the 
geographic redistribution of drug traffickers in Mexico from Sinaloa to other parts, a shift in 
cocaine shipment routes from the Caribbean to Mexico, and the increased participation of 
Mexican security forces in the drug trade.61 
However, these institutional relationships broke down between 1985 and 2000, 
coinciding with a worldwide increase in drug trafficking as well as a transfer of powers from 
security organizations to public safety officials in Mexico.62 The centralized control over drug 
trafficking at the hands of public officials became what Flores Pérez describes as more atomized 
and multi-directional due to the weakening of PRI power towards the end of this period.63 This 
means that instead of centralized control and protection of drug trafficking organizations by 
Mexico’s high level security institutions, local agreements between various organized crime 
groups and public security officials began to determine the state-cartel relationship.64 In the early 
1990s, President Zedillo attempted to diffuse organized crime and the protection that had 
happened under his predecessors, shifting the power dynamics in Mexico; many government 
officials were arrested along with head drug traffickers, and the central control over the drug 
trade was damaged.65 This, along with the splintering of DTO’s into competitive and regionally 
based organizations paved the way for local agreements to take hold between drug traffickers 
and public security officials.66 The Institutional Revolutionary Party’s loss of control in 2000 
resulted in a “[b]reakdown of the old rules, resulting not in a reduction of corruption but rather in 











decreased predictability in the relationships between organized crime and public officials,” 
which continues today.67 
While it is clear that the PRI state had direct and centralized control of drug trafficking 
networks until about 1985, this corrupt system began to fail as the PRI started to lose power and 
the cartels started to fracture.68 The cartels became divided, less predictable, and territorially 
overlapping.69 It is important now, however, to turn to post-2000 drug violence and its 
implications on public security and Mexican society. 
Marcos Moloeznik asserts that one of the primary causes of current violence in Mexico 
today is the dispute between the drug cartels and the government’s recent militarized response to 
gang violence that was implemented by President Fox in 2000 and expanded by President 
Calderón in 2006.70 Drug related violence in Mexico has created a security situation in which 
violence and public security remain the primary governmental and societal concerns due to the 
loss of tens of thousands of lives.71 Although the cartels have been decentralized, they remain 
very powerful and hold much sway over the public security and military officials that have been 
sent to combat them. 
When Vincente Fox of the National Action Party (PAN) took control from the PRI in 
2000, drug related violence increased because the PRI lost its monopoly and centralized control 
over the drug trade.72 Cartels now began to fight each other for control over an unstable drug 
market, which had dramatic effects on political and social life. The PAN government, in an effort 
to put down drug cartels and bring an end to drug related violence, began to militarize its 
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response.73 Beginning in 2005, waves of high profile drug violence began to intensify throughout 
the country.74 In response, President Calderón (also of the PAN) declared war on the drug cartels 
in 2006, increasing the strength and number of forces to decrease drug trafficking in Mexico.75  
As a result of modern political responses to organized crime and drug trafficking 
organizations, combined with changes in global supply, production, and demand of illicit drugs, 
society in Mexico has become highly fragmented and many parts of the country rely on 
organized crime groups and drug trafficking in order to survive.76 The drug cartels are 
geographically expansive and intertwined in many aspects of Mexico’s life, economy, and 
culture.77 Martha Chew Sánchez has noted that the recent para-militarized government response 
to the drug cartels and its resulting increase in violence could signal the end of the stability in 
Mexico.78 She notes that Mexico’s security forces, which have increased in number throughout 
the 2000s in their response to drug trafficking, are corrupt and ineffective, leading to more 
violence and insecurity throughout the country.79 
Today, a major drug trafficking problem still exists in Mexico. Organized crime groups 
have increased their weaponry through the growth of illegal firearms trafficking with the United 
States.80 The cartels today are still powerful and able to corrupt many government officials, 
which has contributed to their survival and an increase in violence and human rights abuse.81 
Drug trafficking is now not the only problem; rather, trends in kidnapping, homicide, and 
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robbery have also grown, and these trends parallel the post-2005 increase in the trade of illicit 
drugs.82 Unfortunately, kidnapping, drug trafficking, law enforcement corruption, and the 
proliferation of more fractionalized criminal enterprises are interrelated.83 Government 
institutions that have been dedicated to providing public security in the wake of this are 
overtaxed, and there is a lack of checks and balances on public entities responsible for providing 
public security in the wake of drug violence.84  
Obviously the presence and growth of drug trafficking, organized crime groups, and 
narco-violence has resulted in a violent and insecure Mexican society that suffers under the 
corruption of public security and subsequent human rights abuses. These arguments are very 
strong in pointing to the historical trends of violence and public security in Mexico. However, 
Mexico’s current responses to organized crime and drug trafficking have changed. It is important 
to look at how institutions responsible for public security in the wake of this violence have 
contributed to human rights violations committed by Mexico’s police. In order to gain deeper 
insight into the causes of police misbehavior, one must look at the public security institutions in 
charge of stopping the drug cartels, and why some scholars say that the violence and insecurity 
problem is a result of these institutions in Mexico. 
Mexico’s Public Security Institutions: Promoting Insecurity? 
The Militarization of Public Security 
 Multiple authors have noted that the increase in drug violence since 2000 and eventual 
war on drugs implemented by President Felipe Calderón created a militarization of public 
security in Mexico that has resulted in human rights violations and police abuse. However, the 
concept of militarization is difficult to define and is interpreted differently by various scholars. 
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Before continuing, this paper will examine what exactly a militarization of public security meant 
for Mexico in the wake of drug violence. 
 For some, a militarization of public security involves the use of the military (rather than 
or alongside the police) in maintaining public security; the involvement of the military in civilian 
issues extends back to the birth of Mexico.85 During the PRI hegemony, the military was 
strongly linked to the President and the party and was widely used in the maintenance of civilian 
public security.86 Sigrid Artz contends that the institutions dedicated to public security became 
overtaxed by the fight against organized crime and drug trafficking, paving the way for the use 
of the military in combatting organized crime groups.87 Moloeznik explains this more, saying 
that the militarization of public security in Mexico is not a new problem; rather, there exists a 
long history of militarization of public security in Mexico that is rooted in public discontent with 
the performance of civilian police institutions who were ineffective in providing a sense of 
public safety.88 Therefore, a sense of militarization has evolved in which Mexico’s national 
security agenda has blended with its public security goals, and the military apparatus has been 
strengthened and expanded in a variety of government areas.89 
 It becomes clear then that one interpretation of “militarization” involves the expanded use 
of the military institution in the realm of public security, either in replace of the police or 
alongside Mexico’s police forces. However, scholars have pointed to deeper instances of 
militarization in Mexico’s history, especially in recent years with the expansion of the war on 
drugs. Chew Sánchez notes that although the military was always involved in Mexico’s attempts 
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to establish public security in the wake of drug violence, their role was widened under the Fox 
administration due to the fact that more drug dealers began to corrupt public security personnel 
(it was at this time that the drug cartels became more atomized and local agreements between 
organized crime groups and public security officers grew).90 This notion of militarization 
describes an increase in the number of soldiers sent to target drug trafficking organizations.91 
However, as the numbers of military personnel deployed in Mexico to provide security in drug 
violence areas grew, so too did the amounts of corruption and violence, spurring the necessity for 
a new strategy at the end of the Fox administration.92 
 Chew Sánchez notes that during Calderón’s war on drugs, paramilitary forces designed to 
fight organized crime grew.93 These forces involved wide deployments of military troops, as 
well as an expansion of the powers and weaponry of police and public security institutions to 
fight alongside the armed forces.94 The combination of police and military personnel and power 
manifested itself in strong and somewhat violent forces that used centralized and militarized 
tactics to target drug lords.95 Furthermore, policymakers emphasized results when deploying 
more police and military personnel.96 This generated more human rights abuses and instances of 
violence at the hands of military and police institutions when targeting drug dealers.97 The trend 
of militarization became multifaceted. “Militarization of public security” expanded to include the 
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enhanced role of the military in public security, increases to military budgets, the expansion of 
the power and weaponry of police institutions, the involvement of armed forces in public 
security efforts, the implementation of military personnel in top police and public security 
(civilian) positions, the integration of armed forces and the Federal Police, and the widespread 
increase in deployed officers and troops across the country.98 
 Scholars argue that the implications of this on modern Mexican society are highly 
problematic. For one, civilian police institutions have become more inefficient and distrusted by 
the public; furthermore, civilian police institutions are varied and exist at all levels of 
government, fragmenting the police forces that have been integrated with the military.99 While 
there is no lack in police personnel, they are underprepared and lack efficiency, professionalism, 
and honesty, resulting in violations of human rights.100  The militarization of public security 
itself due to the war on drugs has caused an acceleration of violence and corruption among the 
police, military, and drug mafias.101 Many military and police personnel continue to be corrupted 
by (and even recruited into) drug cartels, weakening police institutions.102 This undermines 
societal trust in police forces due to a lack of checks and balances on militarized institutions.103 
The existence of accountability and transparency is deficient in Mexico, and leads to impunity, 
institutional weaknesses, and human rights abuses.104 Police are becoming more of a menace to 
society, and human rights are subordinated due to the emphasis on incentivized results.105 
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 Finally, a militarization of public security has created a phenomenon in which there is no 
clear distinction between the military and police.106 In order to be effective, public security must 
be differentiated from national security; however, this is not the case in Mexico. Moloeznik 
points out the main differences between military and police (public security) institutions. The 
military is supposed to be committed to the state, in charge of national security, prepared for 
armed conflict, have a centralized and hierarchical command structure, and use heavy 
weaponry.107 The police on the other hand, are supposed to be in charge of public security and 
safety, responsible for serving and protecting citizens, focused on preventing crime, act in 
smaller and decentralized units, and use light weaponry.108 However, the roles of the two 
institutions in Mexico have intertwined and blended. In effect, both institutions are militarized in 
their focus on domestic public security functions and combatting drug trafficking and organized 
crime.109 As discussed above, the implications of this police model are alarming. It is important 
to now move to Mexico’s police model and why some argue that the police institution itself has 
failed to provide public security for Mexico’s civilians in the wake of militarization. 
Mexico’s Police Model and Why They Aren’t Safeguarding the Public 
 While it is clear that the influence of the military in the public security apparatus has 
created problems of violence and impunity in Mexico, some scholars argue that Mexico’s police 
institutions and model are the root causes of violence, corruption, and insecurity. In Mexico, 
there are over 400,000 police officers throughout the country with 3,000 different forces (2007 
data) at all three levels of government (local, state, and federal).110 Mexico has the most police in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  









the world per 100,000 inhabitants, showing that they are not suffering from a lack in public 
security personnel.111 While the UN recommends 280 police per 100,000 people, Mexico has 
354 police per 100,000 citizens (2009 data).112 The separation of police institutions into three 
different types of forces (municipal, state, and federal) has created problems in Mexico because 
the forces at times have overlapping jurisdictions and powers with different institutional 
frameworks and structures. Reames points out that there are two basic ways to understand police: 
function and jurisdiction.113 At each level, Mexico’s police suffer from confusing organization 
and inefficient use of personnel, especially when placed in areas of high organized crime 
activity, which complicates these understandings.114  Mexico’s police institutions are weak and 
therefore vulnerable to penetration by organized crime.115  
 Guillermo Zepeda Lecuona notes that the shape of government institutions is a reflection 
of the distribution of power in society.116 In Mexico, an inquisitorial system of criminal justice 
exists in which the police are said to be a reflection of a legal environment that is shaped by a 
hegemonic political system (the PRI) in which arbitrary criminal procedures containing little 
public participation takes place.117 Other scholars expand on this, saying that the type of police 
model a country has is related to its national plan; in Mexico, an unclear and militarized police 
model exists, allowing for a weak institutional framework and a blurred line of division with the 
armed forces.118 Some say that the lack of clarity in Mexico’s police model can be partially 
attributed to its recent transition from authoritarianism to democracy. In an authoritarian state, 
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the police model is one that favors those in power and their interests, rather than the rights of the 
citizens.119 A democratic police model, however, adopts a structure in which the police are 
formed with community participation under principles of assistance and protection; the use of 
force is designed to only be to protect citizens.120 Icaza Longoría argues that Mexico’s police are 
not yet in a citizen-secure mindset in which the citizen and human rights are prioritized; rather, 
they are still in an authoritarian public security structure in which the police operate under 
arbitrary action and are willing to break the law in order to produce the results required of 
them.121 Some say that Mexico’s police are “criminal police” that work for the drug cartels, 
undermining rule of law institutions and giving no guarantees that citizens will be safe from 
abuse.122  
 Mario Vázquez Raña argues that the main obstacle to an effective public security 
institution in Mexico is the presence of different police forces with a wide diversity in legal 
jurisdictions and geography.123 An absence of central coordination has caused inefficiency and 
deficiency due to lacks in communication, investigation, and information.124 Mexico’s police 
have been traditionally reactive rather than proactive, and this has led to institutional weakness 
and a loss in credibility.125 Carlos Silva argues that police abuse comes from the nature of tasks 
performed by each police force; informal and formal aspects of the police have created 
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corruption networks in which police adhere to differing objectives while pursuing formal 
duties.126  
 Daniel Sabet explains the structure of Mexico’s police model effectively. Geographically, 
there are municipal, state, and federal police departments with differing responsibilities and 
jurisdictions according to the level of crime.127 The police are also divided into investigative, 
transit, and preventive departments. Preventive police are the largest part of Mexico’s police 
force; they are organized at all three levels of government, and operate under the auspice of 
public security.128 Preventive police’s role is different from investigative and transit police 
because their job is to prevent crime, maintain public order, and respond to instances of 
violence.129 While the three different types of police interact, Mexico’s preventive police are the 
primary actors charged with the maintenance of public security and the rule of law in Mexico. It 
is clear now that the variety of police forces in function and jurisdiction is confusing. This is why 
scholars advocate for police reform, attributing problems of inefficiency and public insecurity to 
a complex police structure. 
 The Federal Police are Mexico’s most powerful police force and charged with protecting 
the populace from organized crime and drug trafficking. It is important to understand their 
structure and powers in order to analyze the causes of violence and human rights abuse in 
Mexico. In 1995 President Ernesto Zedillo introduced the National Public Security System 
(Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública—SNSP) in order to coordinate public security efforts 
and establish strategies for planning and transparency.130 In 1999, he created the Federal 
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Preventive Police (Policía Federal Preventiva—PFP) under the Ministry of the Interior 
(Secretaría de Gobernación—SEGOB) in order to work with local and state agents to maintain 
order and provide public security.131 President Vincente Fox moved the PFP to the Ministry of 
Public Security (Secretaría de Seguridad Pública—SSP) while also creating the Federal 
Investigative Agency (Agencia Federal Investigativa—AFI) to replace Mexico’s corrupt Federal 
Judicial Police (Policía Federal Judicial) in 2009.132 President Calderón then transformed the 
PFP to the Federal Police (Policía Federal—PF) and gave them increased functions of 
prevention, investigation, and control.133 Today’s Federal Police in Mexico now have the 
following abilities: 
[T]he power to conduct intelligence operations and undercover operations, direct or 
participate in the investigations under the instructions of the Public Ministry, preserve 
evidence, interview people who may have information useful for an investigation, and 
intercept private communications (with a warrant) among other functions.134 
While it is clear that Mexico’s Federal Police are autonomous and powerful, many scholars point 
to problems within the Federal Police structure that ultimately cause officers to violate the 
human rights of Mexican citizens.  
 Daniel Sabet contends that police failures (due to structure and organization) ultimately 
undermine democracy and the rule of law.135 When police failure happens, citizens may ignore 
laws, take the law into their own hands, or demand harmful laws that threaten individual 
rights.136 While Mexico’s Federal Police have considerable discretion in using their authority, 
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there are structural problems present that have caused many to advocate for widespread police 
reform in Mexico.  
A primary obstacle to respectful and effective police behavior is a lack in training.137 
Mary O’Rawe contends that police training forms the base for police functioning and that the 
learning environment during training must be thorough, broad-based, and consultative.138 
Training and education must engage with issues of police culture and subculture in order to 
integrate human rights norms, as this will create a society in which human rights and citizens 
become the center of police work.139 
 However, Mexico’s police suffer from quick and insufficient training.140 Furthermore, 
the turnover rates of police officers and high-level officials in Mexico are quite high, resulting in 
a lack of institutional stability.141 The police have deficient equipment, unrealistic performance 
goals established by their superiors, and little guidelines and mechanisms to prevent, correct, or 
punish abuses of power.142 The police are highly reactive and unfocused on public security or 
social conflict, which results in an irrational use of human and material resources.143  Finally, the 
police have low salaries and complain of terrible working conditions.144 This, in combination 
with poor education and training, has created a Federal Police force in Mexico that is highly 
susceptible to corruption and therefore generates poor public perceptions and distrust.  
While the arguments surrounding public security militarization and structural weakness 
of the police institutions in Mexico are strong in their attempts to explain police violence, there is 
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more needed to explain why Mexico’s public security model produces police impunity. In other 
words, what other factors contribute to police brutality and violence, outside of the police 
institution itself? In order to give a more in depth analysis of the police institutions and their 
relationships with both drug cartels and the citizens of Mexico, this paper will examine a final 
school of thought on why there are so many human rights violations committed by Mexico’s 
police. To answer this, scholars point to a cultural problem in Mexico in which corruption and 
distrust are norms that facilitate relationships that allow police impunity and drug violence to 
flourish in Mexican society. 
Corruption and Public Distrust: Cultural Obstacles to Mexican Security 
 Scholars argue that rising insecurity and the lowered rule of law in Mexico are fueled by 
police corruption and impunity.145 Davis argues that a corrupt police force and weak judicial 
system make criminality flourish in Mexico, even among the police officers themselves.146 
However, before the argument can be made that police brutality in Mexico is fueled by 
corruption, the question of where corruption comes from must be explored in order to assert that 
police violence and impunity is a cultural problem in which corruption is part of a society which 
allows human rights violations to flourish. 
 Davis asserts that a culture of corruption and impunity in Mexico dates back to the 1910 
revolution with its roots in Mexico City.147 In this period, post-revolutionary political leaders 
made deals with military leaders in the establishment of Mexico’s new police forces; the most 
important priority for political leaders was to create a new police that was loyal to the regime so 
that they could consolidate their power over the Mexican state.148 As a result, the Mexican police 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  







force was given considerable leeway and little discipline so that they could effectively stabilize 
the population.149 This became a clientelistic system in which officers loyal to the presidency 
were given considerable autonomy and power as a reward for political support.150 Davis argues 
that these power arrangements became the norm in Mexico and fueled a culture of corruption 
surrounding the relationship between law enforcement officers and the Mexican population 
because the police were able to ignore judicial and legal institutions in order to accomplish the 
goals created by those in power.151 Scholars argue that this system of clientelistic relationships 
created a lasting culture of corrupt power dynamics in which citizens and state officials learned 
to operate through bribes and patronage. 
 Although corruption in Mexico is said to have started with the PRI and its use of military 
and police officers to bring stability to the emerging state, scholars still argue that it is a culture 
of corruption that has spread throughout Mexico that causes the police to continue to abuse their 
power. Before continuing on this, it is important to know what corruption in Mexico, and 
particularly among the police, looks like in everyday actions. Elena Azaola notes that Mexico’s 
political (and police) system operates on the basis of personal and political connections, relating 
to a “mafia” culture of relationships.152 Others note that a culture exists in which priority is given 
to illegal activities such as covering up crime and abusing authority, which fails to serve the 
public.153  
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In reality, police corruption and criminality ranges from taking bribes to involvement in 
corruption scandals and the abuse of power on larger scales.154 Day-to-day bribe payments occur 
between police and citizens alongside collusion with organized crime and payments for 
employment and promotions within state institutions.155  Furthermore, bribery at traffic stops is 
extremely common, and the citizens have become willing participants in corruption throughout 
Mexico, establishing informal rules that govern the relationship between police and citizens.156 
The resulting effect is that the police in Mexico are now the most common recipients of bribe 
money and that organized crime leaders dominate the relationships between bribers and 
recipients.157 Unfortunately, a lack of transparency and citizen oversight of the police in Mexico 
deepens the culture of corruption.158 
Systemic reasons for this corruption cannot be ignored. Although the corruption is said to 
have originally stemmed from the clientelistic relationships generated by the PRI in post-
revolutionary Mexico, a sense of commonplace corruption has been established and now fuels 
police abuse and violence. However, other societal factors fuel the culture of corruption. For one, 
deficient working conditions for the police (including low wages, long work shifts, and a lack of 
promotions), along with job insecurity and inconsistent rules and procedures that govern police 
institutions fuel corrupt police practices.159 Police in Mexico complain of a lack in recognition of 
their efforts, poor uniforms, harsh treatment by their superiors, and low quality equipment that 
they are required to pay for.160 While poor police salaries are commonly pointed to as a major 
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contributors to police corruption, these bad working conditions help to explain why so many 
police participate in corrupt behavior that fuels impunity and the abuse of power.  
Unfortunately, the public is unsympathetic to the police; rather, police corruption has 
generated a negative perception of the police nationwide along with widespread public distrust in 
the police institution. For years, the police force has been a primary public concern due to 
corruption and inefficiency.161 In reality, bribery has a larger impact on public satisfaction of the 
police than does insecurity, and citizens feel forced to participate in the problem because they see 
no imminent solution.162 Bribery, in combination with other factors, has resulted in massive 
citizen distrust of the police.163 Other factors contributing to public distrust include a lack in 
investigative measures employed by the police, absence of professionalism, poor systems of 
information and intelligence, lack of mechanisms for the protection of human rights, faults in 
transparency, and confusion regarding the existence of so many different types of police.164 
While it is clear that there are problems of transparency, legitimacy, and trust in Mexico’s 
police, the results are problematic.165 Two common citizen reactions stemming from distrust 
include failure to report crime when it happens and employment of private security forces or 
taking the law into their own hands in order to bring about a sense of public security.166 In fact, 
75% of crimes in Mexico are unreported due to citizen distrust in public security institutions.167 
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The media helps to feed distrust of the police, and it seems unlikely that this cycle of distrust, 
police corruption, and violence will go away.168  
The argument that a culture of corruption fuels police impunity is qualitatively strong. It 
is obvious that corruption has fueled a system of relationships in Mexico that is based on bribery 
and patronage, and that these relationships stem from the legacies of the PRI as well as 
institutional shortcomings within the police force. However, this argument is difficult to prove: 
the ability to quantitatively show that corrupt behaviors are commonplace in Mexican society is 
limited and even this argument faces obstacles when demonstrating causal relationships between 
corruption and police violence. Therefore, it is more believable that police violence in Mexico 
stems from a combination of institutional weakness and drug violence that help to generate 
corruption. 
History, the drug war and subsequent militarization of public security, and institutional 
weakness have contributed to widespread corruption in Mexico and an abundance of human 
rights abuses. But, the purpose of the public security apparatus in Mexico is to protect the 
people; rather, the police are contributing to public insecurity. While the military has been shown 
to be part of this problem, it is necessary to look at Mexico’s Federal Police (the most powerful 
police institution in Mexico) to understand where they are in the perpetuation of human rights 
abuses. This paper will look to show that while institutions can play a role in police behavior, 
they are not the only cause of human rights abuse in Mexico. Rather drug violence and the 
presence of organized crime seem to be highly related to police impunity in Mexico.  
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Hypothesis and Methodology 
 This paper argues that high levels of drug violence and organized crime are strongly 
correlated with increased levels of violence, insecurity, and human rights abuses in Mexico 
committed by the Federal Police apparatus. In order to analyze this, the institutional and 
historical schools of thought discussed above will be explored more deeply. It should be noted 
that Mexico has attempted to reform the police structure numerous times. Therefore, recent 
reform efforts to the police in the past decade will be examined. In order to analyze the 
effectiveness of these reforms, this paper will then present data on human rights abuses 
committed by Mexico’s Federal Police. Using a quantitative and time-trend analyses, one can 
verify the effectiveness of police reform efforts.  
 In order to then show that drug violence seems to be the highest indicator of police 
violence and brutality in Mexico, the human rights abuse data will be matched to drug violence 
data in both geographic and time contexts. From this comparison numerous conclusions and 
recommendations for further research regarding the inherent causes of public insecurity and 
police misbehavior in Mexico can be generated. 
Mexico’s Federal Police Institution and Reform Efforts 
 Mexico’s attempts at reforming the police institution since the inception of the first 
Federal Police force have been frequent and thorough. To start, President Ernesto Zedillo created 
Federal Preventive Police (Policía Federal Preventiva—PFP) in 1999 and constituted them 
under the Ministry of the Interior (Secretaría de Gobernación—SEGOB).169 The institution 
began with about 10,000 members (some military) and was supposed to work with local and 
state agents on intelligence and investigative duties.170 However, President Vincente Fox, who 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





came to power in 2000, reconstituted the PFP and moved them under the Ministry of Public 
Security (Secretaría de Seguridad Pública—SSP).171 He also created the Federal Investigative 
Agency (Agencia Federal de Investigación—AFI) to replace the former federal judicial police, 
and they were entrusted with heightened investigative duties.172 In 2008, however, President 
Felipe Calderón began a series of reforms that combined the AFI and PFP into the new Federal 
Police (Policía Federal—PF) under the National Security Commission (Comisión Nacional de 
Seguridad—CNS) with heightened powers, a new police model, and increased deployments of 
officers.173 
 The 2008/2009 reform package (that would continue for eight years) introduced by 
President Calderón sought to thoroughly reform the police and judicial system in Mexico. The 
constitutional reforms of 2008 included are listed in the following table.174 The qualitative 
substances and objectives of the new laws and reforms will be described in more detail below. 
2008/2009 Police and Judicial Reform Package 
Ley General del Sistema Nacional de 
Seguridad Pública 
General Law of the National System of Public 
Security 
Ley de Policía Federal Law of the Federal Police 
Código Federal de Procedimientos Penales Federal Code of Penal Procedures 
Ley Federal contra la Delincuencia 
Organizada 
Federal Law against Organized Crime 
Normas Minimas sobre Readaptación de 
Sentenciados 
Minimal Norms about the Re-adaptation of the 
Sentenced 
Código Penal Federal Federal Penal Code 
Ley Orgánica de la Procuraduría General 
de la República 
Organic Law of the Attorney General 
Sistema de Desarollo Politico (sidepol) System of Political Development 
Juntas de Seguimiento y Evaluación Policial 
(Jusep) 
Police Monitoring and Evaluation Plan 
Programa Sensores Juveniles Juvenile Sensor Program 
Plataforma México Platform Mexico (technological development) 









President Calderón sought to centralize, modernize, and coordinate all police forces with 
solid, professional, transparent, and effective police institutions.175 The new police reforms 
contained initiatives for better prevention/repression of crime, investigation, fairer trials of 
criminals, a new penitentiary/rehabilitation system for criminals, and a post-penitentiary 
system.176 Through this, the goal was to make all internal institutional systems more efficient, 
effective, and economical.177  
The police reforms were centered on tenets that included the creation of a police civil 
service degree, a unified police structure, a system of incentives based on higher-level objectives, 
and changes in legislation/legal proceedings.178 In detail, the reforms sought to accomplish the 
following: redefine the police doctrine; improve the requirements for joining the police; create 
systems of modern and permanent formation; clarify training processes; professionalize 
institutional structures; establish social protection systems; redefine the relationship between the 
police and military; generate better internal control systems; create accountability; enhance 
institutional processes; and generate improved information systems.179 Furthermore, human 
rights became an important part of the new police and justice systems in Mexico, and police 
were to be better educated in human rights standards as well as trained in methods to avoid 
violations; new sanctions were created for offenses.180 In essence, the new police model was to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 Ibid. 
176 Gil García and Martínez Tiburcio, “El proceso de transformación y consolidación institucional de la Policía 
Federal.” 
177 Ibid. 
178 Carlos Barrachina, “El Nuevo Modelo Policial y su relación con los derechos humanos,” in Los Derechos 
Humanos en el marco del Nuevo Modelo de Policía (México: Centro de Investigación y Estudios en Seguridad, 
2012). 
179 Dammert and Ungar, “La necesidad de un nuevo modelo de policía en México: Una perspectiva comparada.” 




become citizen-centered and human rights centered so that it could be more democratic in 
form.181 
A new hallmark of the reformed police force was the implementation of investigatory and 
preventive operations that included technical, tactical, and strategic analyses of information 
obtained from the generation of intelligence.182 This meant that the police (as part of the reform 
package) were given more autonomy, larger capacities to make decisions and evaluate situations, 
and investigatory powers (alongside previous technical and operative powers that were in place 
under the reactive model).183 The preventive and intelligence based models needed new 
information and communication infrastructure; investments into these and better equipment were 
also part of the reform package.184 New institutional divisions within forces, alongside special 
functions that include communication intervention and undercover operations were developed.185 
Better technology would be used for more integrated and interconnected collaboration between 
police forces.186 Overall, the reforms sought to create a preventive and investigative police, 
rather than a solely reactive institution.187  
Furthermore, the professionalization of officers became a key component of the new 
police model, as the reforms sought to evaluate and rule out weaknesses of the institution while 
formulating programs of transformation in order to create a modern and efficient police 
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system.188 Professionalization components also included new requirements, education 
curriculums, trainings, human resources procedures, and evaluations; therefore, the selection, 
evaluation, and formation of police elements would require more care and resources.189  
Three strategic elements for the development of capable institutions included the 
prioritization of police activity in strategic areas, the strategic utilization of supervisors and 
informants, and the placement of intelligence in the center of the decision making process.190 
Alongside the new strategic elements were a restructuring of the police force to have scientific, 
intelligence, communication, collaboration, and managerial centers/divisions.191 Accompanied 
with the reforms were increases in resources allocated to public security institutions.192 This 
involved an increase in officer deployments as well as increases in the number of officers on the 
Federal Police force (about 40,000 by 2010), who were supposed to be better educated and more 
professionalized; this would be a quantitative and qualitative enhancement of the police force.193 
Judicial reforms were also set to be major improvements for Mexico. For one, the judicial 
system was to become adversarial (rather than inquisitorial).194 Simply put, this meant that the 
accused would be presumed innocent and Mexico would see the implementation of fairer judicial 
processes (including new rights and oral trials) at all levels of government.195 Furthermore, the 
penitentiary system in Mexico was to undergo a transformation within the judicial reforms so 
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that the rights of the accused as well as tried prisoners would be better treated alongside 
international human rights standards.196 
 In summary, the new police and justice models set out to improve fragmented procedures 
and structures, generate preventive and investigative forces, professionalize members, modernize 
systems of operation, improve coordination, introduce intelligence and information procedures 
and systems, and generate human-rights respecting institutions.197 An analysis of trends in 
human rights abuses committed by the Federal Police is provided below in order to see how 
effective the 2008/2009 reforms have been. It is important to keep in mind that these reforms 
have a six-year implementation period. Therefore, they have until 2016 to be fully completed at 
all levels of government. 
Human Rights Abuses Committed by the Federal Police 
 Mexico’s National Human Rights Commission (Comisión Nacional de los Derechos 
Humanos—CNDH) is responsible for overseeing and protecting human rights of all people in 
Mexico, especially if infringed upon by government officials. In doing this, it collects complaints 
regarding human rights abuses, investigates these complaints, and then publishes 
recommendations (to be sent to the violating government institution) that outline the abuse that 
was committed as well as what should be done to remedy the human rights violation. Anyone in 
Mexico is able to submit a complaint, and it can be done so anonymously. Unfortunately, the 
CNDH holds no judicial power and cannot try perpetrators of human rights abuses. Rather, it can 
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only collect data on human rights violations and recommend to offending institutions ways to 
remedy the abuse.  
 This analysis will first look at the recommendations that have been published against the 
Federal Police in Mexico and see what type of abuses are being committed by Federal Police 
officers. It is important to note that this analysis only looks at the Federal Police; state and 
municipal level forces are not included in this dataset. However, any collection on abuses 
committed by these forces would enhance this research. Figure 1 illustrates the types of abuses 
committed by Mexico’s Federal Police based on CNDH Recommendations.198 The most 
common violations that Federal Police officers seem to commit are those that include physical 
injury, excessive/arbitrary use of force, and cruel/inhumane treatment. These types of violations 
show that officers are abusing their authority in an attempt to eliminate crime. Also notable are 
the instances of torture, denial of access to justice, abuse, illegal holding, and arbitrary detention. 
While the motivations behind these violations need further analysis, it is important to note that 
the 2008/2009 police reforms that sought to professionalize, better train, and improve police 
coordination are meant to prevent these violations from occurring.  
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To see whether or not the reform efforts have been effective, it is important to now look 
at how human rights violations have either increased or decreased by year. Figure 2 outlines the 
number of recommendations that the CNDH has published about the Federal Police each year 
since 2000.199 It is important to note that these numbers only reflect CNDH recommendations, 
not the number of complaints that the institution has received. Therefore, better variance among 
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years is provided by Figure 3, which illustrates the number of complaints the CNDH has 
received about the Federal Police each year since 2007.200  
The purpose of providing data on both the number of recommendations and complaints is 
twofold. First, both can show whether or not police reforms have been helpful since their 
inception in 2008 and 2009. Second, they present a new problem involving the massive lack of 
CNDH complaints that become recommendations. This obviously warrants further investigation 
and is outlined below. 
Primarily, the figures showing the numbers of recommendations and complaints point to 
potential ineffectiveness of police reform efforts. In both, the numbers of complaints and 
recommendations regarding human rights violations by the Federal Police escalated in 2010, 
after the police reforms had already been put in place. While the reform efforts likely did not 
cause the police to commit more human rights violations, there are a variety of correlating 
factors that could be causing this to happen, including drug violence trends, changes in 
recommendation and complaint processes in the CNDH, or the slow implementation of police 
reforms. However, this data implies that the institutional school of thought is not best when 
analyzing the motivations behind police misbehavior in Mexico, as reforms are not affecting 
police behavior. The institutional reforms are not helping the police to respect human rights and 
generate better public security. Therefore, other variables must be more effective in predicting 
human rights violations by the police in Mexico other than the police institution itself. 
The quantitative differences between the numbers of complaints and recommendations by 
the CNDH are significant. On average, 1.3% of complaints to the CNDH about the Federal 
Police have become published recommendations. While there is always the possibility that a 
complaint is resolved during the investigation process (investigations can take anywhere from 3-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




36 months), there is a clear issue at hand that continues to warrant more investigation into why 
so many complaints are not published as recommendations after submission to the CNDH. 
Furthermore, as stated above, the recommendation does not guarantee justice. Therefore, this 
paper encourages further analysis into Mexico’s CNDH processes as well as the investment of 
deeper judicial authority into the human rights commission. 
Drug Violence and Police Brutality: A Comparison 
 This paper will now turn to a comparison of drug violence data and CNDH data on 
human rights violations in an attempt to demonstrate a relationship between drug violence and 
police behavior. This paper uses data on organized crime related homicides separated by state 
and year from 2007-2014. Then, it compares this to complaints to the CNDH about Federal 
Police human rights violations (also separated by state and year from 2007-2014). After, a p-
value is provided to demonstrate potential statistical significance.  
 Figure 4 illustrates aggregate organized crime related homicides in Mexico from 2007 to 
2014.201 It slightly parallels trends in Federal Police human rights violations, showing a jump in 
2009 and 2010 which was followed by a slight decline in 2013 and 2014 in organized crime 
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related homicides. This begins to show a national-level correlation between drug violence and 
police human rights abuse because both drug related homicides and police abuses seemed to 
increase around 2010 and decrease near 2014. While a variety of factors could be responsible for 
these trends, the data points to the possibility that police behavior is affected by drug-related 
activity and organized crime violence. However, conclusions cannot yet be drawn because it is 
quite possible that the two instances of violence (drug-related and police-related) differ by 
geographic region or state.	  This	  would	  mean	  that	  some	  states	  may	  have	  seen	  increases	  in	  
drug-­‐related	  violence	  while	  other	  states	  experienced	  increases	  in	  police-­‐related	  violence.	  
In	  order	  to	  demonstrate	  whether	  or	  not	  this	  variation	  exists,	  data	  on	  state-­‐level	  violence	  
(both	  organized	  crime	  related	  and	  police	  related)	  are	  provided	  below. 
 Figures 5 and 6 show state-level variance between 2007 and 2014 for organized crime 
related homicides202 and complaints about Federal Police human rights violations203. The data is 
separated in per capita measures in order to illustrate true state-level variance. This means that 
the sets of information provided show which populations suffered from the most instances of 
police related violence or organized crime related violence. Per capita measures are able to put 
each state on an even base when taking measurements and to show true variance. The graphs 
demonstrate that between 2007 and 2014, there are similarities between states with the highest 
levels of drug violence and the highest instances of police human rights abuse. For example, 
states such as Baja California, Guerrero, and Durango all saw higher instances of both drug 
violence and Federal Police human rights abuse. Furthermore, states such as Puebla and 
Queretaro saw lower instances of both during the same seven years. 
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However, it is important to note that in both drug-related homicides and human rights 
violations committed by the police, data can vary by year within states. Figure 4 showed that 
some years saw highly increased instances of drug violence, and Figure 3 shows that some years 
saw higher instances of human rights violations by the Federal Police. While these increases on a 
national level paralleled each other, it is quite possible that during these years, drug violence and 
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show if a state like Sinaloa saw an increase in drug violence in 2009 while other states may have 
seen a decrease, or if a state like Michoacán saw an increase in human rights abuses committed 
by the Federal Police while other states may have seen a decrease or stagnant rate in the same 
year. Therefore, it is necessary to examine each state’s number of organized crime related 
homicides and each state’s number of human rights violations during each measured year to get a 
truly accurate portrayal of potential correlation. To do that, all data (each state, year, and 
variable) have been combined into a scatter plot. Figure 7 shows the relationship between the 
two measured variables (the number of organized crime related homicides and the number of 
complaints against the Federal Police to the CNDH occurring in each state during each year).  
 While the chart above does not show an extremely strong statistical relationship, it should 
be noted that a correlation value of 0.362 was generated when comparing the relationship 
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related homicides in each state between 2007 and 2014. While this value does not show 
causation, it points to a significant relationship between the two variables. Therefore, it is clear 
that a relationship between drug violence and police abuse exists in Mexico. The fact that human 
rights abuses committed by the Federal Police are related to organized crime related homicides 
points to the idea that police behavior can be predicted by drug-related activity. Because it is a 
positive correlation, areas with higher instances of drug violence are more likely to see increased 
abuses by police forces. While the factors behind this behavior need examination, this trend 
shows that the police in Mexico are more likely to abuse their power in areas with higher 
amounts of illicit drug activity. However, other factors may exist that can also affect police 
behavior in Mexico, which are explored in more detail below.  
Other Factors Affecting Police Brutality 
 Before it can be concluded that drug violence is a strong predictor of police brutality, two 
other variables are looked at. Figure 8 compares poverty levels in each state with complaints to 
the CNDH about the Federal Police. The purpose of comparing state-level poverty measures and 
complaints about human rights violations by the Federal Police is to see if there is a statistically 
significant relationship between poverty and police abuse. If there is, then it may be that socio-
economic status has a stronger effect on police behavior than drug violence. For the purposes of 
this measure, the hypothesis is that states with a larger percentage of the population living in 
poverty are more likely to experience human rights abuses committed by the Federal Police. 
Poverty measures are given by the percentage of the population in each state living below the 
poverty level.204 For this measure each state’s poverty level in the years of 2008, 2010, and 2012 
are compared. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





 The figure shows that no relationship exists between state poverty levels and complaints 
about human rights abuses committed by the Federal Police. Furthermore, the two datasets 
generated a correlation value of 0.011, demonstrating no relationship between poverty levels and 
police behavior. This means that no matter the poverty rate in each state, the police are likely to 
act in the same way or continue to abuse human rights. Poverty cannot serve as a predictor of 
police behavior in Mexico. 
 Figure 9 compares the final variable, state education levels, with complaints to the 
CNDH about the Federal Police. The purpose of comparing education levels and complaints 
about Federal Police human rights violations is to see whether or not more or less educated states 
in Mexico experience different relationships with the police. For the purposes of this test, the 
hypothesis is that states with more educated populations are more likely to see lowered instances 






















Poverty	  Level	  by	  State	  
F8:	  Relationship	  between	  Poverty	  Levels	  and	  HR	  




taken by the percentage of the population in each state that has completed secondary 
education.205 For this measure, the years of 2008, 2010, and 2012 are compared. 
 
 The two datasets for this test generated a correlation value of -0.071, demonstrating a 
very small negative correlation. While a statistically significant relationship is nonexistant, this 
data shows that areas with higher education rates have a slightly smaller chance of seeing police 
human rights violations. However, the weak correlation value means that in reality, education 
levels do not predict police behavior. There, both poverty and education levels are weak 
predictors of police abuse while drug violence is much stronger. From this all, it can be 
determined that drug violence is a strong predictor for human rights violations committed by 
Mexico’s police and that a statistically significant relationship between drug activity and police 
behavior exists in Mexico. The police in Mexico, therefore, are likely to be influenced by the 
presence and activities of drug cartels and organized crime groups. 
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Explaining Outlying Cases 
 Before concluding, however, one last explanation is needed. As Figures 5 and 6 showed, 
multiple states see high levels of drug violence and very low levels of human rights violations 
committed by Mexico’s Federal Police. For example, states such as Sinaloa and Nuevo Leon sit 
on opposite sides of the two graphs. Multiple factors could be contributing to this difference, and 
each requires deeper research. 
 Primarily, drug cartels in certain areas of Mexico likely operate differently. They may 
manipulate the population in different ways, and some cartels may have more influence over 
police behavior than others. Furthermore, police protection mechanisms may exist in different 
areas, making it either easier or harder for them to be held accountable to human rights 
violations. Even though the Federal Police is one police force, it may interact with each 
population differently in various states depending on the relationships between societies, cartels, 
the military, and the police.  
Finally, some populations may be either more or less trusting of the police, which could 
affect their ability and desire to report human rights abuses. For instance, it is possible that the 
public is more fearful of police behavior in some areas than others, and this may hinder their 
ability to report abuses to the CNDH. For each of these possibilities, local or state level research 
is needed that examines the relationships between cartels, the population, and public security 
forces. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 This paper has examined the reasons behind increasing levels of crime, insecurity, and 
police violence in Mexico. More specifically, an analysis of Mexico’s Federal Police in the 




most powerful police force, the Federal Police seem to be contributing to increasingly high levels 
of violence, crime, and insecurity. 
 Three perspectives have been provided to analyze this problem and helped explore 
important answers. The historical school of thought said that Mexico’s current public insecurity 
and police violence is a result of the old Institutional Revolutionary Party’s authoritarian 
manipulation of public security forces. The ruling style of PRI, combined with its relationship 
with drug cartels, helped to stimulate the rise of drug violence in Mexico that led to the eventual 
War on Drugs. The institutional argument said that a highly militarized public security apparatus, 
combined with structural police weaknesses and inefficiencies, has contributed to Mexico’s 
modern problems of police misbehavior, human rights violations, and public insecurity. Finally, 
a cultural school of thought said that a culture of corruption in Mexico prevails which results in 
public mistrust of the police and allows for violence and police brutality to abound. 
 This paper argued that drug violence and the presence of organized crime in Mexico is 
most strongly correlated with high levels of violence, insecurity, and human rights abuses 
committed by the police in Mexico. After an analysis of modern police reforms efforts, human 
rights violation data, drug violence data, and comparisons of poverty and education levels, it can 
be concluded that the presence of drug violence in Mexico has the potential to strongly affect 
police behavior and public security. While this is not a causal relationship, Mexico’s police are 
affected by drug trafficking organizations and areas with heightened drug violence are more 
inclined to experience a violent police force and enhanced public insecurity. 
 While no explanation is perfect in pointing to a causal factor, a history of drug trafficking 
in Mexico has created a situation in which the police abuse human rights either out of the need to 




comparing all information presented, it seems that a cycle exists in which drug violence and 
Mexico’s authoritarian past have generated large levels of corruption that the police buy into. 
This then fuels human rights abuses committed by the police and perpetuates public insecurity. 
Unfortunately, drug cartels and organized crime groups in Mexico thrive off of this public 
vulnerability and the deteriorated rule of law, which allows this drug violence-police abuse cycle 
to strengthen. Unfortunately, it is not easy to break this cycle; simply addressing drug traffickers 
or the police institution will not solve problems of corruption. As has been seen, corruption can 
continue to fuel public insecurity and the 
subsequent strength of drug cartels, which 
are able to negatively affect police 
behavior. To enrich this examination, 
further research is needed at local levels. 
The relationships between police, public, 
military, and drug trafficking organizations 
should be examined at state and municipal 
levels so that stronger conclusions 
regarding the reasons behind police 
misbehavior and public insecurity can be uncovered. This will allow policy to better adapt to the 
violent situations throughout Mexico and at the US-Mexico border.  
 No one strategy can be implemented in order to solve the situation in Mexico. Rather, a 
multi-level combination of strategies should be taken on by both the United States and Mexico in 
order to bring about a heightened sense of public security in the region. For one, police reform 











government so that the police can be better incentivized and trained to work against organized 
crime and for the common citizens. Second, efforts to limit the power of drug trafficking 
organizations should be examined so they can be weakened from the top-down and bottom-up. 
Furthermore, public security should be de-militarized and poverty should be rooted out so that 
the population is less vulnerable to powerful organized crime groups. Finally, Mexico’s human 
rights commission should be strengthened and given more judicial powers to enhance their 
efforts to protect human rights in Mexico. There is much that the international community can do 
to help this situation; knowing the root causes of Mexico’s public insecurity can help to stop the 
high levels of drug violence, military abuse, and police brutality that plague Mexico’s population 
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